Germany has been blamed because she invaded Belgium in August when Britain had promised to protect Belgium. However, the street celebrations that accompanied the British and French declaration of war gives historians the impression that the move was popular and politicians tend to go with the popular mood. The alliance between Germany and Austria was natural. Both spoke the same language — German — and had a similar culture.
In previous centuries, they had both been part of the same empire — the Holy Roman Empire. Austria was in political trouble in the south-east of Europe — the Balkans.
She needed the might of Germany to back her up if trouble got worse. Italy had joined these countries as she feared their power on her northern border.
Each member of the Triple Alliance Germany, Austria and Italy promised to help the others if they were attacked by another country. The Triple Entente was less structured than the Triple Alliance. France was suspicious of Germany.
Those numbers did not take into consideration the cost of prosecuting the war by the allies. Nor did it take into consideration the cost of civilian damages on the Eastern Front, nor the costs to Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey or Russia, not to mention the smaller powers, of fighting the war as well. Finally, there was no way of quantifying the "value" of the staggering loss of life nor the continuing costs of caring for the wounded and maimed.
The "cost" of World War I is a highly subjective measure. These figures are often cited, although it is not clear how they were determined. In reality, we will never really know what the total cost of the war actually was. Regardless of the number used, it was a staggering amount. It is a truism of military conflict that the victor writes the history. Given the frightful cost of the war, and the determination of the winners to recover as much of the cost of fighting as possible, it was a forgone conclusion that the loser would have to acknowledge culpability for "causing" the war -- a fact amply well documented in historical accounts, especially those written by British and French writers.
The undue emphasis on blame, and therefore culpability, led to a bias toward identifying a single cause. It is easier to assess damages when there is only one guilty party.
Multiple defendants meant varying degrees of culpability and responsibility, and made it correspondingly harder to fix damages on each of the parties in question. This was manifestly clear at the Versailles Peace Conference where the payment for "war guilt" was placed entirely on Germany, even though it had been Austria that had issued the first declaration of war and triggered the various mutual support provisions that tied the members of the two alliances together.
History in general, and military history in particular, lends itself readily to a discussion of the "what ifs. Under what conditions might war have been avoided? Would a different set of decisions have yielded a vastly different outcome? This essay marks the beginning of a new series on World War I.
I will examine three events: the formation of the alliances that ultimately went to war; the assassination of the Archduke Ferdinand and his wife Sophia in Sarajevo and the "July Crisis" that followed; and Germany's decision to attack France first Schlieffen Plan , which had a profound impact on the nature and scope of World War I.
All three events could easily have evolved differently; indeed, historical precedent would have suggested that the final outcomes had been anomalous. The events that led to the outbreak of World War I, and the range of actors involved, were far too complex to be reduced to a single cause, that does not mean, however, that a different set of decisions would not have yielded a different result. The calculus that spawned the war was the product of the interaction of a broad range of variables.
Even slight changes in any one of them might have affected the outcome in ways we can't always surmise. There is a huge number, perhaps an infinite number, of possible scenarios. The road that led to war had many exits along the way; any one of which would have averted the catastrophe, or at the very least reduced the scope of the destruction.
In the end, tragically, none of those exits were taken. Joseph V. Micallef is a military historian, bestselling author, keynote speaker, syndicated columnist and commentator on international politics and the future. Was the war an accident or design, inevitable or planned, caused by sleepwalkers or arsonists?
To my mind the war was no accident and it could have been avoided in July In Vienna the government and military leaders wanted a war against Serbia. The immediate reaction to the murder of Franz Ferdinand on 28 June was to seek redress from Serbia, which was thought to have been behind the assassination plot and which had been threatening Austria-Hungary's standing in the Balkans for some time.
Crucially, a diplomatic victory was considered worthless and "odious". At the beginning of July, Austria's decision-makers chose war. But in order to implement their war against Serbia they needed support from their main ally Germany. Without Germany, their decision to fight against Serbia could not have been implemented. The Berlin government issued a "blank cheque" to its ally, promising unconditional support and putting pressure on Vienna to seize this golden opportunity.
Both governments knew it was almost certain that Russia would come to Serbia's aid and this would turn a local war into a European one, but they were willing to take this risk.
Germany's guarantee made it possible for Vienna to proceed with its plans - a "no" from Berlin would have stopped the crisis in its tracks. With some delay Vienna presented an ultimatum to Serbia on 23 July which was deliberately unacceptable. This was because Austria-Hungary was bent on a war and Germany encouraged it because the opportunity seemed perfect. Victory still seemed possible whereas in a few years' time Russia and France would have become invincible.
Out of a mixture of desperation and over-confidence the decision-makers of Austria-Hungary and Germany unleashed a war to preserve and expand their empires. The war that ensued would be their downfall. It is human nature to seek simple, satisfying answers, which is why the German war guilt thesis endures today. Without Berlin's encouragement of a strong Austro-Hungarian line against Serbia after Sarajevo - the "blank cheque" - WW1 would clearly not have broken out.
So Germany does bear responsibility. But it is equally true that absent a terrorist plot launched in Belgrade the Germans and Austrians would not have faced this terrible choice.
Civilian leaders in both Berlin and Vienna tried to "localise" conflict in the Balkans. It was Russia's decision - after Petersburg received its own "blank cheque" from Paris - to Europeanise the Austro-Serbian showdown which produced first a European and then - following Britain's entry - world conflagration.
Russia, not Germany, mobilised first. Still, none of the powers can escape blame. All five Great Power belligerents, along with Serbia, unleashed Armageddon. The war was started by the leaders of Germany and Austria-Hungary. Vienna seized the opportunity presented by the assassination of the archduke to attempt to destroy its Balkan rival Serbia. This was done in the full knowledge that Serbia's protector Russia was unlikely to stand by and this might lead to a general European war. Germany gave Austria unconditional support in its actions, again fully aware of the likely consequences.
Germany sought to break up the French-Russian alliance and was fully prepared to take the risk that this would bring about a major war. Some in the German elite welcomed the prospect of beginning an expansionist war of conquest. The response of Russia, France and later Britain were reactive and defensive. The best that can be said of German and Austrian leaders in the July crisis is that they took criminal risks with world peace.
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